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Ronald F. Inglehart (born September 5, 1934 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin) is a political scientist at the University of Michigan. He is director of the World Values Survey, a global network of social scientists who have carried out representative national surveys of the publics of over 80 societies on all six inhabited continents, containing 85 percent of the world's population. In the seventies he developed the sociological theory of post-materialism.
1.1 The Silent Revolution
1.2 Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society
1.3 Modernization and Postmodernization
1.4 Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World
1.5 Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide
1.6 Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy
1.7 Cosmopolitan Communications
3 External links
 WritingsRonald Inglehart's numerous writings have been extremely influential, and have since been translated and published in German, Italian, Spanish, French, Swedish, Brazilian Portuguese, Russian, Polish, Croatian, Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, Persian, Urdu and Indonesian. Below are brief descriptions of some of his most influential works:
 The Silent RevolutionIn The Silent Revolution (1977) Inglehart discovered a major intergenerational shift in the values of the populations of advanced industrial societies. In his 1989 book Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society Inglehart uses a large body of time-series survey data from twenty-six nations gathered from 1970 through 1988 to analyze the cultural changes that are occurring as younger generations gradually replace older ones in the adult population. These changes have far-reaching political implications, and they seem to be transforming the economic growth rates of societies and the kind of economic development that is pursued. Economic, technological, and sociopolitical changes have been changing the cultures of advanced industrial societies during the past several decades. Inglehart examines changes in religious beliefs, work motivation, political conflict, attitudes toward children and families, and attitudes toward divorce, abortion, and homosexuality.
 Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial SocietyCulture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Economic, technological, and sociopolitical changes have been transforming the cultures of advanced industrial societies in profoundly important ways during the past few decades. This ambitious work examines changes in religious beliefs, in motives for work, in the issues that give rise to political conflict, in the importance people attach to having children and families, and in attitudes toward divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. Ronald Inglehart's earlier book, The Silent Revolution (Princeton, 1977), broke new ground by discovering a major intergenerational shift in the values of the populations of advanced industrial societies. This new volume demonstrates that this value shift is part of a much broader process of cultural change that is gradually transforming political, economic, and social life in these societies. Inglehart uses a massive body of time-series survey data from twenty-six nations, gathered from 1970 through 1988, to analyze the cultural changes that are occurring as younger generations gradually replace older ones in the adult population. These changes have far-reaching political implications, and they seem to be transforming the economic growth rates of societies and the kind of economic development that is pursued.
 Modernization and PostmodernizationIn Modernization and Postmodernization (1997) Inglehart argued that economic development, cultural change, and political change go together in coherent and, to some extent, predictable patterns. Inglehart theorised that industrialization leads to related changes such as mass mobilization and diminishing differences in gender roles. Changes in worldviews seem to reflect changes in the economic and political environment, but take place with a generational time lag. Following industrialization, advanced industrial society leads to a basic shift in values, de-emphasizing instrumental rationality. Postmodern values then bring new societal changes, including democratic political institutions and the decline of state socialist regimes.
 Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the WorldWritten with Pippa Norris, The Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) examines how the twentieth century gave rise to profound changes in traditional sex roles. This study reveals how modernization has changed cultural attitudes towards gender equality and analyzes the political consequences. It systematically compares attitudes towards gender equality worldwide, comparing almost 70 nations, ranging from rich to poor, agrarian to postindustrial. This volume is essential reading to gain a better understanding of issues in comparative politics, public opinion, political behavior, development and sociology.
 Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics WorldwideInglehart's 2004 book with Pippa Norris, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide reexamines the secularization thesis. This book draws on a base of new evidence generated by four waves of the World Values Survey executed from 1981 to 2001 in eighty societies, covering most of the world’s major faiths. Examining religiosity from a broader perspective and in a wider range of countries than have been done before, this book argues that religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those in poorer nations and in failed states, facing personal survival-threatening risks. Exposure to physical, societal and personal risks drives religiosity. Conversely, a systematic erosion of traditional religious practices, values and beliefs may have occurred among the more prosperous strata in rich nations. But at the same time, a growing proportion of the population—in both rich and poor countries—spends time thinking about the meaning and purpose of life. It is argued that in developed countries, the established churches are losing their ability to tell people how to live their lives, but spiritual concerns, broadly defined, may be becoming increasingly important.
 Modernization, Cultural Change and DemocracyThis book was written in collaboration with Christian Welzel. (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), This book demonstrates that people's basic values and beliefs are changing, in ways that affect their political, sexual, economic, and religious behavior. These changes are roughly predictable because they can be interpreted on the basis of a revised version of modernization theory presented here. Drawing on evidence from societies containing 85% of the world's population, the authors argue that modernization is a process of human development, in which economic development triggers cultural changes that make individual autonomy, gender equality, and democracy increasingly likely.
 Cosmopolitan CommunicationsInglehart's latest book, written with Pippa Norris. In Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) he argues that societies around the world have experienced a flood of information from diverse channels originating beyond local communities and even national borders, transmitted through the rapid expansion of cosmopolitan communications. For more than half a century, conventional interpretations, Norris and Inglehart argue, have commonly exaggerated the potential threats arising from this process. A series of fire-walls protect national cultures. This book develops a new theoretical framework for understanding cosmopolitan communications and uses it to identify the conditions under which global communications are most likely to endanger cultural diversity. The authors analyze empirical evidence from both the societal level and the individual level, examining the outlook and beliefs of people in a wide range of societies. The study draws on evidence from the World Values Survey, covering 90 societies in all major regions worldwide from 1981 to 2007. The conclusion considers the implications of their findings for cultural policies.
A growing body of evidence indicates that deep-rooted changes in world views are taking place. These changes seem to be reshaping economic, political, and social life in societies around the world. The most important body of evidence comes from the World Values Surveys (WVS), which have measured the values and beliefs of the publics on all six inhabited continents in 1981, 1990, and 1995. The WVS will carry out its fourth wave of surveys in 1999-2000. It has already surveyed more than sixty societies representing almost 75 percent of the world's population and covering the full range of variation, from societies with per capita incomes as low as three hundred dollars per year, to societies with per capita incomes one hundred times that high; and from long-established democracies with market economies, to authoritarian states and societies making the transition to market economies. This unique investigation has found strong linkages between the beliefs of individuals and the characteristics of their societies--such as those between peoples' values and the birth rates of their societies, or between political culture and democratic institutions. Figure 1 shows the societies that have been explored in the two most recent waves of these surveys.
The WVS have detected a pattern of systematic changes in values and motivations among those of advanced industrial societies. These changes reflect economic and technological changes that have tremendously reduced the likelihood that people will die prematurely from starvation or disease. Figure 2 demonstrates a well-known but very significant fact: as economic development takes place, human life expectancy rises. In the poorest countries of the world, even today the average life expectancy is forty years or less. In the richest [End Page 215] societies, such as Japan or Switzerland, it approaches eighty years. But this relationship is curvilinear. We find a steep rise in life expectancy as income rises from the subsistence level to several thousand dollars per year; but when we reach the ranks of the advanced industrial societies, there is very little increase. Life expectancy in Germany is no higher than it is in Ireland, even though the average German income is twice as high. This suggests that industrializa-tion and economic growth have a tremendous payoff in terms of human survival, but beyond a certain point they bring diminishing returns.
Figure 3 demonstrates a fact that is [End Page 216] equally significant, but was not recognized until the WVS measured happiness and life satisfaction throughout the world. Human happiness also shows a strong linkage with economic development. Here, too, the relationship is curvilinear. As one moves from subsistence-level economies, such as India or Nigeria, to advanced industrial societies, there is a large increase in the proportion of the population who consider themselves very happy or very satisfied with their lives as a whole. But above a certain level (about where South Korea or Ireland currently are), the curve levels off. Among advanced industrial societies, there is practically no relationship between income level and subjective well being. Here too, Ireland ranks higher than West Germany. [End Page 217]
As one would expect, rising income levels go with rising levels of happiness and life satisfaction. The peoples of rich societies are happier than those of poor societies. The overall correlation is very strong (0.68). But beyond a certain point, the curve levels off. As we move from low-income societies to high-income societies, there is a steep increase in subjective well being. But the impact of rising income stops when we reach the threshold of $10,000. Beyond that point, there is practically no relationship between income and subjective well-being. The Irish are happier than the Germans, although the Germans are twice as wealthy. And the Taiwanese are as happy as the Japanese although the Japanese are three times as wealthy.
The relationship between economic development and subjective well-being shows another important finding: Communist rule had huge costs--not only materially, but also in terms of human happiness. Figure 3 demonstrates another important point: in the 1990s, the lowest levels of subjective well-being in the world were not found in the very poorest societies, such as India or Nigeria, but in the ex-Communist societies.
India and Nigeria are the poorest societies in Figure 3, and they show lower levels of subjective well-being than any advanced industrial society. But the ex-Communist societies are spectacular underachievers: their people are much less happy than those of other societies, even much poorer ones. This is especially true of the countries of the former Soviet Union.
India, for example, is a low-income society and ranks lower than virtually any advanced industrial society, with a score of about thirty on the subjective well-being index. But the countries of the former Soviet Union rank lower than India although their income levels are three or four times higher than India's. Even the people of the highest-ranking Soviet successor state (Estonia) are less happy than those of India, and the people of Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, and Ukraine show almost incredibly low levels of subjective well-being. Each of them falls below the zero point on this index, which means that a majority of their people consider themselves unhappy and dissatisfied with their lives as a whole. Subjective well-being was already extremely low in Russia in 1990, but life satisfaction and happiness have fallen even lower since the collapse of the Communist system and the Soviet Union, to such a degree that Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine show the lowest levels of subjective well-being ever recorded.
The phenomenally low levels of subjective well-being currently registered [End Page 218] in the countries of the former Soviet Union have disturbing implications. As we will see below, reasonably high levels of subjective well-being seem to play a crucial role in the survival of democratic institutions.
The early phases of economic development seem to produce a big return, not only in terms of life expectancy but also in terms of human happiness. But the return levels off; above a certain point (roughly, Ireland's current level) economic growth doesn't seem to make much difference. Among the advanced industrial societies, there is still a lot of variation. Some societies rank much higher than others (for example, the Nordic societies rank far above Germany or Japan) but the difference seems to reflect lifestyle factors rather than economic determinism. Economic development eventually reaches a point of diminishing returns not only in terms of life expectancy but also in terms of human happiness. This leads to a gradual but fundamental shift in the basic values and goals of the people of advanced industrial societies.
The early stages of economic development seem to have a major impact on subjective well-being. Moving from a starvation level to a reasonably comfortable existence makes a big difference. But beyond a certain threshold, the subjective payoff from economic development ceases. Portugal and South Korea are now approaching this threshold. Great Britain and the United States passed it decades ago. Moving beyond this threshold leads to a gradual intergenerational shift in basic values in the societies that have passed this threshold. Figure 4 illustrates what happens. Societies at the early stages of the curve tend to emphasize economic growth at any price. But as they move beyond a given threshold, they begin to emphasize quality of life concerns such as environmental protection and lifestyle issues.
Throughout most of human history, for most people, survival has been uncertain. Even today, most of the world's people are not far above the subsistence level, and starvation is a real possibility. But for the peoples of advanced industrial societies, from North America to Western Europe to Japan, the economic [End Page 219] miracles of the postwar era, combined with the modern welfare state, have given rise to a new situation. In these societies hardly anyone starves, and a growing share of their population takes survival for granted. Though still interested in a high, material standard of living, they take it for granted and place increasing emphasis on the quality of life. Though economic growth is still valued, an increasing share of the public is willing to give environmental protection priority over economic growth when they conflict.
I began to measure one aspect of these cultural changes back in 1970, hypothesizing that the postwar generation in Western Europe would have different value priorities from older generations, because they have been brought up under much more secure formative conditions. While the generations that had experienced World War II, the Great Depression, and World War I would give top priority to economic and physical security, a growing share of the younger generation would give top priority to self-expression and the quality of life. Our research was guided by two key hypotheses: 1
A scarcity hypothesis. An individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment. One places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply.
A socialization hypothesis. The relationship between socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment; a substantial time lag is involved for one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre-adult years.
The scarcity hypothesis implies that recent economic developments have [End Page 220] significant consequences. During the period since World War II, advanced industrial societies have attained much higher real-income levels than ever before in history. Coupled with the emergence of the welfare state, this has brought about an historically unprecedented situation: Most of their population does not live under conditions of hunger and economic insecurity. This has led to a gradual shift in which needs for belonging, self-expression, and a participant role in society became more prominent. Prolonged periods of prosperity tend to encourage the spread of postmaterialist values; economic decline tends to have the opposite effect.
But there is no simple one-to-one relationship between economic level and the prevalence of post-materialist values. These values reflect one's subjective sense of security, not one's economic level per se. While rich people tend to feel more secure than poor people, one's sense of security is also influenced by the cultural setting and social welfare institutions in which one is raised. Thus, the scarcity hypothesis must be supplemented with the socialization hypothesis: a basic personality structure tends to take shape by the time an individual reaches adulthood and changes relatively little thereafter.
Taken together, these two hypotheses generate a set of predictions concerning value change. First, while the scarcity hypothesis implies that prosperity is conducive to the spread of postmaterialist values, the socialization hypothesis implies that neither an individual's values nor those of a society as a whole will change overnight. For the most part, fundamental value change takes place as younger birth cohorts replace older ones in the adult population of a society. Consequently, after a long period of rising economic and physical security, one should find substantial differences between the value priorities of older and younger groups; they have been shaped by different experiences in their formative years.
This thesis was first tested in surveys carried out in 1970 with representative national cross-sections of the publics of Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The people interviewed chose the goals they considered most important among a set of items designed to tap economic and physical security, on one hand, or self-expression and the nonmaterial quality of life, on the other hand.
Figure 5 shows the results from these surveys. As hypothesized, we found large differences between the values of younger and older generations. [End Page 221] Among the oldest age groups, we found an overwhelming majority to be materialists; those who gave top priority to economic and physical security outnumbered the postmaterialists (those who gave top priority to belonging and self-expression) by fourteen to one. But as we move from older to younger groups, the proportion of materialists declines and the proportion of postmaterialists increases. Among the postwar generation, postmaterialists outnumber materialists.
We interpreted these findings as resulting from an intergenerational value shift. Theoretically, these age differences could simply reflect life-cycle effects, which means that as the younger groups grew older, they would become just as materialistic as the older ones. But we have now followed these respective age groups over a quarter century. The younger groups did not become more materialistic as they aged. An intergenerational value shift is taking place. And as predicted, the ratio of postmaterialists to materialists has increased substantially in most societies. Figure 6 shows the changes that took place from 1970 to 1994 in the United States and seven other Western societies for which we have data covering a long time period. We find similar results in Japan.
This shift from materialist to postmaterialist values is only one aspect of a much broader shift from modern to postmodern values that is taking place throughout advanced industrial society. Postmodern values are uncommon in most developing societies; they are still moving from traditional to modern values. Both traditional and modern values were shaped by economic scarcity, which prevailed almost everywhere until recently. But during the past few decades, a new set of postmodern values has been transforming the social, political, economic, and sexual norms of rich countries around the [End Page 222] globe. These new values reflect conditions of economic security. If one grows up with a feeling that survival can be taken for granted, instead of the feeling that survival is uncertain, it influences almost every aspect of one's worldview.
In politics, insecurity is conducive to xenophobia, a need for strong decisive leaders and deference to authority. Accordingly, the Great Depression gave rise to xenophobic and authoritarian politics in many societies around the world. A sense of basic security has the opposite effect. Postmodern values emphasize self-expression instead of deference to authority and are tolerant of other groups and even regard exotic things and cultural diversity as stimulating and interesting, not threatening.
The economic outlook of modern industrial society emphasized economic growth and economic achievement above all. Postmodern values give priority to environmental protection and cultural issues, even when these goals conflict with maximizing economic growth.
Modern industrial society was made possible by two key institutions: the mass production assembly line and bureaucratic organizations. These institutions made it possible to process huge numbers of products and huge numbers of people using centrally controlled standardized routines. They were highly effective, but they sharply reduced individual autonomy, which takes on an increasingly high priority in advanced industrial societies. As a result, hierarachical, centrally controlled bureaucratic institutions are becoming less acceptable in postmodern society.
In both traditional and early industrial society, the role of women was largely limited to child-bearing and child-rearing, two functions that were crucial to the survival of society, under conditions of high infant mortality and short life expectancy. By the time a woman had borne and raised the four or five children that were needed to replace the population, she was probably near the end of her life span. Sexual norms were rigidly geared to encouraging reproduction, but only within the two-parent heterosexual family. Today, with much lower infant mortality, and a much longer life span, Postmodern society is moving toward sexual norms that give wider latitude for individual sexual gratification and individual self-expression.
Religious orientations are changing too. In the uncertain world of subsistence societies, the need for absolute standards and a sense that an infallible higher power will ensure that things ultimately turn out well filled a major [End Page 223] psychological need. One of the key functions of religion was to provide a sense of certainty in an insecure environment. Physical as well as economic insecurity intensify this need; the old saying that "there are no atheists in foxholes" reflects the fact that physical danger leads to a need for belief in a higher power. But peace, prosperity, and the welfare state have produced an unprecedented sense of security that one will survive. This has diminished the need for the reassurance that religion traditionally provided. The postmodern world view is linked with declining acceptance of rigid religious norms concerning sex and reproduction and a diminishing need for absolute rules. But it also brings a growing concern for the meaning and purpose of life. Thus, though established religious organizations have declined in most advanced industrial societies, we are not witnessing a decline in spiritual concerns but rather a redirection of them.
This change in world views has given rise to a wide range of new social movements, from the environmentalist movement to the women's movement, and to new norms concerning cultural diversity and growing acceptance of gay and lesbian lifestyles. Since the start of recorded history, in virtually all societies, women have been restricted to completely different roles from those of men. Throughout advanced industrial societies, gender role differences are eroding. Established authority is increasingly being questioned. One consequence is that, though the economy was performing remarkably well by the usual indicators, trust in government among the U.S. public reached an all-time low in the mid-1990s. This did not reflect a state of political apathy; though party loyalty and voter turnout was falling, people were participating in petitions, political demonstrations, and boycotts in unprecedented numbers. The established political parties were losing their ability to bring out the voters, but elite-challenging political actions were steadily rising.
Changing values influence economic growth rates. A change in prevailing values--the rise of the Protestant ethic--played a crucial role in the rise of capitalism, paving the way for the Industrial Revolution. Until this happened, virtually all agrarian societies, including Christian Europe, stigmatized social mobility. In agrarian societies, the main source of wealth was land, which is in fixed supply; the only way to become rich was to seize someone else's land--probably by killing the owner. Such violence threatened the survival of any society, and was repressed by norms that emphasized [End Page 224] acceptance of the status into which one was born and stigmatized the economically ambitious. At the same time, traditional societies emphasized duties of sharing and charity--which helped compensate the poor for the absence of social mobility, but further undermined the legitimacy of economic accumulation.
In Western history, the rise of the Protestant ethic--a materialistic value system that tolerated economic accumulation and encouraged it as something laudable and heroic--was a key cultural change that opened the way for capitalism and industrialization. But precisely because they attained high levels of economic security, the Western societies that were the first to industrialize have gradually come to emphasize postmaterialist values, giving higher priority to the quality of life than to economic growth. In this respect, the rise of postmaterialist values reverses the rise of the Protestant ethic. Today, the functional equivalent of the Protestant ethic is most vigorous in East Asia and is fading away in Protestant Europe, as technological development and cultural change become global.
Mass values and attitudes are a major influence on whether or not democratic institutions survive in a given society. In the last several years, new democracies in Central Europe, East Asia, and the former Soviet Union have held their first free elections. But it is one thing to adopt formal democracy and another thing to attain stable democracy. Immediately after World War I, a number of new democracies were established, many of which did not survive the stresses of the interwar era. The most tragic and fateful case was that of Germany, where Hitler became chancellor through free elections.
Associated with defeat from its start, Weimar Germany soon faced the hyperinflation of the 1920s, was unable to maintain internal order, and finally collapsed under the impact of the Great Depression in the 1930s. After World War II, the West German regime did develop legitimacy, but it did so gradually. At first this acceptance was based on the postwar economic miracle. If a society has a high level of subjective well-being, its citizens feel that their entire way of life is fundamentally good. Their political institutions gain legitimacy by association.
If one feels that one's life as a whole has been going well under democratic institutions, it gives rise to a relatively deep, diffuse, and enduring basis of support for those institutions. Such a regime has built up a capital of mass support that can help the regime weather bad times. Legitimacy is helpful to any regime, but authoritarian systems can survive through coercion; [End Page 225] democratic regimes must be legitimate in the eyes of their citizens or, like the Weimar republic, they can be voted out of existence.
Figure 7 shows levels of subjective well-being in more than forty societies, based on combined responses to questions about life satisfaction and personal happiness. As this figure shows, societies with a relatively strong sense of subjective well-being are much more likely to be stable democracies than societies characterized by a low sense of well-being. More detailed analysis 2 confirms that subjective well-being plays an important role in legitimizing democratic institutions. Because subjective well-being is diffuse and deep-rooted, it provides a relatively stable basis of support for a given type of regime. Conversely, when people are dissatisfied with politics, they may change the parties in office. And when people become dissatisfied with their lives, they may reject their entire form of government or even break up the existing nation, as happened to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Only rarely does mass dissatisfaction reach this level.
Normally, most people tend to describe themselves as either "happy" or "fairly happy"; and far more people describe themselves as satisfied with their lives as a whole than dissatisfied. Already in the 1990 WVS, the then-Communist societies revealed the lowest levels of subjective well-being ever recorded in research on this subject. In several of these countries, as many people described themselves as "unhappy" as "happy"; and as many said they were "dissatisfied with their lives as a whole" as said they were "satisfied." This is an alarming finding. Subjective well-being had fallen to unheard-of levels. It is not surprising that, within two years, the economic and political systems had collapsed throughout Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist.
In the 1995 WVS, subjective well-being had fallen even lower in Russia (reaching an unprecedented low level of -12, which means that most of the Russian people were unhappy and dissatisfied with their lives as a whole). In Russia's 1996 presidential elections, the three leading contenders were Boris Yeltsin, the principal reformist candidate; a hard-line Communist candidate who represented the authoritarian Soviet model of politics; and an even more alarming xenophobic nationalist who promised to reestablish the former Soviet empire. For most of the year, it looked as if Yeltsin would lose. In the end he pulled out a victory, using methods that did not exactly fit democratic norms, but which averted potentially worse alternatives. Our [End Page 226] latest data suggest that democracy is becoming fairly secure in Central and Eastern Europe but that it hangs by a thread in Russia and most other countries of the former Soviet Union.
One interpretation would be that democratic institutions give rise to the cultural syndrome of self-expression values. In other words, democracy makes people healthy, happy, tolerant, and trusting and instills postma-terialist values (at least in the younger generation). I would love to believe this interpretation. It provides an enormously powerful argument for democracy, and implies that we have a quick fix for most of the world's problems: adopt democratic institutions and live happily ever after. Unfortunately, the experience of the people of the former Soviet Union doesn't support this interpretation. Since moving toward democracy in 1991, they have not become healthier, happier, more trusting, more tolerant or more postma-terialist. On the whole, they have moved in exactly the opposite direction.
Another interpretation is that the processes of modernization and post-modernization gradually give rise to social and cultural changes that make democratic institutions increasingly likely to survive and flourish. That would help explain why mass democracy did not emerge until a relatively recent point in history, and why, even now, it is most likely to be found in economically [End Page 227] more-developed countries, in particular, those that have high levels of postmodern values. This interpretation has both encouraging and discouraging implications. The bad news is that democracy is not something that can be easily attained by simply adopting the right laws. It is most likely to flourish under specific social and cultural conditions--and today, those conditions are not pervasive in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova.
The good news is the long-term trend of the past several centuries has been toward economic development, a process that has accelerated and spread around the world during the past few decades. Economic development seems conducive to the social and cultural conditions under which democracy is most likely to emerge and survive. If the current outlook is discouraging in much of the former Soviet Union, the evidence in Figure 8 suggests that a number of other societies are closer to democracy than is generally suspected. Mexico, for example, seems ripe for the transition to democracy; its position on the postmodern values axis is roughly comparable to that of Argentina, Spain, or Italy. And the Chinese show a surprisingly high score on the values' dimension linked with democracy. The ruling Communist elite is committed to maintaining one-party rule, and as long as they retain control of the military they can probably hang on to power. But the Chinese public shows a predisposition toward democracy that would probably surprise most observers. As we have seen, economic development is conducive to the spread of postmaterialist values, which give increasingly high priority to freedom of speech and political participation, and is linked with the emergence of relatively high levels of subjective well-being. In the long run, economic development tends to bring cultural changes that are conducive to democracy. These changes are part of a broader process linked with the emergence of postmodern values.
Ronald Inglehart is a professor of political science and program director in the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.
1. Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).
2. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
بررسی روان شناختی، تحول ارزش ها (عبداللطیف محمد خلیفه) - کتاب (انتشارات آستان قدس رضوی) [کتاب / روانشناسی]
سازنده: : انتشارات آستان قدس رضوی
این محصول تولید انتشارات آستان قدس رضوی بوده و دارای مجوز نشر از وزارت فرهنگ و ارشاد اسلامی جهت عرضه در فروشگاه های مرتبط می باشد .
نويسندگان : عبداللطیف محمد خلیفه
مترجمان : حسین ی
سال چاپ : 78
موضوع : روانشناسی
نوع جلد : شومیز
تعداد صفحه : 299
نوبت چاپ : اول
ارزش از دیدگاه روانشناسی
از جمله پژوهشگرانی که درباره ارزش نظریات متفاوتی ارائه کرده اند، روانشناسان هستند. یکی از مکاتب عمده ی روانشناسی که توجه عمده ای به ارزش نموده است، مکتب انسان گرایی ( humanism) است که پس از ارائه ی تعاریف ارزش از دیدگاه روانشناسی، به آن خواهیم پرداخت.
● برداشت هایی از مطلوبیت ها
تری یاندیس Triandis از جمله روانشناسانی است که به تعریف ارزش پرداخته است. او با قائل شدن به تمایز میان ارزش و مطلوبیت، معتقد است مطلوبیت ها موقعیت ممکن جهان هستند، ارزش ها اصولی هستند که زندگی ما را هدایت می کنند. جهت گیری های ارزشی برداشت هایی از مطلوبیت ها هستند. ارزش ها انسان ها را به سوی جنبه هایی از محیط که باید به آن ها توجه شود و همچنین اهدافی که باید به آن ها برسند، هدایت می کنند. ارزش ها در عین حال ملاک هایی فراهم می کنند که مر دم می توانند برای ارزیابی رفتار خود و دیگران از آن بهره گیرند( تری یاندیس، ۱۳۷۸).
● نگرش هایی معطوف به اهداف و نه وسیله ها
میلتون روکیج ارزش را نگرشی بنیادی درباره برخی شیوه های گسترده رفتار از قبیل شهامت، شرافت و دوستی یا بعضی حالات شبه هدف هستی مانند رستگاری، آزادی و خودشکوفایی (Self – fulfillment) می داند. از این قرار، ارزش ها نوعی نگرش اند اما به هدف ها اطلاق می شوند نه به وسیله ها. مثلا فردی که نگرش مثبتی نسبت به پول دارد ممکن است در توجیه آن بگوید که با داشتن پول می توان بازنشسته شد و بازنشستگی به او این امکان را می دهد که درس موسیقی بیاموزد و موسیقی بنا به تعریف روکیج ارزش محسوب نمی شود زیرا در حکم وسیله است نه هدف، یعنی وسیله ای برای رسیدن به ارزش خودشکوفایی.
● توجیه گر چرایی رفتار
مورای، ارزش ها را در کنار نیروهای عاطفی یکی از عوامل تحرک بخش شخصیت تلقی می کند و مفهوم ارزش ها را قدر و قیمت یا قدرتی می داند که هر کس ممکن است در امور ببیند. در نظر مورای "نیروهای عاطفی توجیه گر چگونگی رفتار هستند و ارزش ها توجیه گر چرایی آن." از جمله مصداق هایی که وی برای ارزش ها عنوان می کند عبارتند از: سلامت بدن، قدرت اراده و تصمیم، صحبت دوسویه، ارزش های هنری و ... که با نیروهای عاطفی مانند ساختن و آفریدن، نگاه داشتن، به دست آوردن و نظایر آن آمیخته شده و در شکلدهی رفتار، موثر واقع می شوند(مورای، ۱۳۷۹).
● هادی گزینش یا ارزیابی رفتار
شوارتز(Schwartz) با الهام و الگوبرداری از روکیج ارزش ها را هم چون مفاهیم یا باورهایی تعریف می کند که به رفتارها و یا موقعیت های پایانی مطلوب منجر می شوند، به موقعیت های خاص برتری می بخشند، گزینش یا ارزیابی رفتار و حوادث را هدایت می کنند و به واسطه اهمیت نسبی منظم می شوند( تری یاندیس، ۱۳۷۸).
● نیازهای اساسی
مازلو که نظریه پرداز بزرگ مکتب روانشناسی است و نظریه ی او پایه و اساس بسیاری از نظریات در عرصه روانشناسی اجتماعی و انواع گرایش های جامعه شناسی ست، ارزش ها را برآمده از نیازهای اساسی انسان می داند و آن ها را در سرشت آدمی جستجو می کند. او ارزش ها را سلسله مراتبی می داند که هر یک نسبت به دیگری در اولویت قرار دارد.
وی درک حیات انسانی را اساسا در گرو توجه به ارزش ها و والاترین آرزوهای انسانی مانند کمال جویی، خودشکوفایی، سلامت، هویت، استقلال و تعالی می داند که در قالب نیازهای اساسی در درون سرشت انسان نهفته است و با ارضاء این نیازهای اساسی در صورت همراهی با نوعی ایمان و تعهد، نظامی از ارزش های فردی متبلور می گردد. همان طور که گفته شد سلسله مراتب نیازهای مازلو منشا الهام بسیاری از نظریه پردازی در زمینه سلسله مراتب ارزش ها گردیده است، آلپورت در حوزه روانشناسی و اینگلهارت در حوزه سیاسی. در شکل زیر هرم طبقه بندی نیازهای مازلو آمده است (مازلو، ۱۳۷۲)
برحسب نظر مازلو، ارضای هر یک از نیازهای عاطفی، شناختی، بیانی و زیبایی شناختی انسان یک ارزش به شمار می رود. مازلو از جمله کسانی است که ارزش را مترادف نیاز می داند، از این منظر ارزش اساس بیولوژیک دارد و بر نیازهای اساسی مبتنی است و نیازهای اساسی همان چیزهایی هستند که ارگانیسم و نظام انتخاب های او را شکل داده و تعیین می نماید و به مثابه ارزش های زیستی است که به مرور، هم زمان با رشد فرد به ارزش های اجتماعی تغییر می یابد.
● بازنمایی شناختی نیاز های فرد یا جامعه
روکیج و برخی دیگراز روانشناسان از جمله منتقدان مازلو بودند، که معتقدند ارزش ها در واقع بازنمایی های شناختی نیازهای فرد یا جامعه هستند و تنها در نزد انسان دیده می شوند.
در برخی مکاتب روانشناسی ارزش مترادف انگیزه نیز به کار رفت. ارزش به مثابه آرمان ، هدف یا حقیقت از بعضی جهات جدا از شخص است، خصوصا وقتی که ارزش جنبه ی جمعی داشته باشد زیرا به عنوان یک محرک می تواند و یا باید بر انگیزه های افراد موثر واقع شود، اما انگیزه برعکس، خود محصول مجموعه ای از نیازها، فشارها، خواست ها، آگاهی ها و ناآگاهی هایی است که شخص را به حرکت و جنبش وا می دارد. با وجود این تفاوت برخی از روانشناسان ارزش را به مثابه انگیزه می دانند. بنکستن و فدر(۱۹۹۷) از جمله این افراد هستند. فدر ارزش ها را به مثابه ساختاری متضمن و وجدان و موقعیت کنونی فرد و مشتمل بر چیزهای خوب یا بد و مثبت و منفی می داند و معتقد است که با فرضیه شناختی انگیزش، همخوانی دارد؛ مبنی بر این که انگیزه های افراد، آنان را به سوی آن چه مثبت است سوق می دهد و از آن چه منفی است دور می سازد. فدر معتقد است «تصور ما از ارزش ها» در واقع گروهی از انگیزه هاست (خلیفه، ۱۳۷۸).
در مقابل این دیدگاه راک. ایچ. ام معتقد است که ارزش ها مانند انگیزه ها صرفا فشارهایی برای جهت دهی به رفتار خاص نیستند، بلکه نظامی از افکار و تصورات جهت دهنده رفتار در پس انگیزه هاست. برخی افراد مک کله لند را نیز پیرو این دیدگاه می دانند و می گویند که انگیزه ی موفقیت در نظریه مک کله لند یک ارزش است در حالی که انگیزه موفقیت مک کله لند به عنوان جنبه ای از شخصیت تلقی می شود، تئوری وی نه موفقیت را به عنوان ارزش مورد سنجش قرار می دهد و نه نیاز به موفقیت را در ارتباط با مسائلی خاص ارزیابی می کند، بلکه تئوری مذکور وضع روانی عمومی فرد را در کلیه وضعیت های رقابتی، به منظور دست یابی به موفقیتی برتر مورد بررسی قرار می دهد (روشه، ۱۳۶۶).
● رفتار های مطلوب
چارلز موریس و آدلر (۱۹۵۶) از جمله کسانی هستند که در مکتب روانشناسی، ارزش ها را به منزله ی رفتار در نظر می گیرند به طوری که چارلز موریس ارزش ها را رفتارهای گزینشی و مطلوب می داند. رفتارهایی که از انسان سرمی زند اگر از درجه مطلوبیت برخوردار باشد ارزش است، همچنین آدلر معتقد است که ارزش ها را می توان در یکی از معانی زیر تصور کرد:
ـ چیزهای مطلقی که دارای هویت مستقل هستند.
ـ مفاهیمی که از راه های نیازهای زیستی فرد و باورهایی که به آن پایبند است، حاصل می شوند.
ـ شامل موضوع یا اشیاء مادی و غیرمادی هستند.
ـ مساوی و همگن با فعل یا رفتار هستند.
همان طوری که آدلر در تعریف بالا نشان داده است، وی ارزش را مساوی رفتار می داند.
اسکات (۱۹۶۵) از جمله کسانی ست که به نقد دیدگاه آدلر پرداخته است. او معتقد است اگر ارزش ها مفهومی مترادف با رفتار تلقی شوند، مشخص نمی کند که نوع رفتاری را که فرد انتخاب می کند بر چه اساسی است، آیا عملی است یا صرفا یک لفظ است. بنابراین ارزش ها مفهومی تجریدی تر از رفتارها هستند و متضمن معیارهایی بوده که موجب ترجیح دادن بر اساس آن ها می شوند. بدین ترتیب گرایش ها و رفتارها هر دو حاصل رویکردهای ارزشی اند و نمی توان ارزش را همگون و مساوی رفتار دانست.
در مکاتب روانشناسی برخی از افراد هستند که ارزش را به مثابه میل در نظر گرفته اند. پری (۱۹۸۲) با طرح فرضیه عام در ارزش ها، ارزش ها را در تطابق با مفهوم میل یا گرایش می بیند و در این باره معادله زیر را مطرح می سازد:
▪ ارزش میلی = میلی که آن را مورد توجه قرار می دهد؛ یعنی آن جا که ارزش، نتیجه وجود یک میل به چیزی خاص است اگر آن چیز موضوع میل باشد، دارای ارزش است.
در نظر آلپورت و فرتون نیز ارزش ها چیزی جز کشش های خاص به سوی چیزها یا موقعیت ها و یا اشخاص نمی باشند. فروندیزی در موافقت با پری معتقد است «ارزش ها هم خوانی و همگنی با آن چیزی است که آن را ترجیح می دهیم و یا به آن میل و رغبت داریم و نمایانگر کانون علاقه و میل ماست.»
● ترجیحات اجتماعی
آیزنک H.Eysench در نقد نظرات پیش گفته در مورد مترادف بودن ارزش با میل معتقد است که میل آن چیزهایی را شامل می شود که برای فرد جاذبه است، اما ارزش ها در واقع نمایانگر آراء و ترجیحاتی است که به موضوع های اجتماعی مربوط هستند. چایلد نیز همین اعتقاد را دارد. او میل را غالبا به ترجیحات شغلی مرتبط می داند و ارزش را امری می داند که به موضع های اجتماعی، سیاسی، دینی و اخلاقی ناظر است. بنابراین میل یکی از جلوه های متعدد ارزش است و محدودتر از ارزش و به ندرت می توان گفت که میل دارای ویژگی وجوب و معیار که از وجوه ممیزه ارزش هاست، می باشد. همان طور که در تعاریف و نظریات فوق مشاهده می شود، در مکتب روانشناسی ارزش در فرد تحلیل می شود یعنی کانون توجه ی آن ها فرد است، لذا در مکتب روانشناسی وقتی سخن از ارزش گفته می شود بیشتر ارزش های فردی مدنظر است. برخلاف جامعه شناسان که بر ارزش های اجتماعی تاکید دارند، روانشناسان توجه خود را به ویژگی های فردی ارزش متمرکز می کنند (خلیفه، ۱۳۷۸).
ارزش در اصطلاح دانش جامعهشناسی، عقایدی است که افراد یا گروههای انسانی درباره آنچه مطلوب، مناسب، خوب یا بد است؛ دارند. ارزشهای مختلف نمایانگر جنبههای اساسی تنوعات در فرهنگ انسانی است. ارزشها معمولاً از عادت و هنجار نشأت میگیرند.به طور کلی به اموری که برای اعضاء گروه اهمیت دارند و هدف مشترک اعضاء گروه تلقی می شوند، ارزش می گویند.
منابع فرامرز رفیع پور. آناتومی جامعه یا سنة الله: مقدمهای بر جامعهشناسی کاربردی. تهران: انتشارات کاوه، ۱۳۷۷.
آنتونی گیدنز. جامعهشناسی. ترجمهٔ منوچهر صبوری. چاپ سوم، تهران: نشر نی، ۱۳۷۶، ۲۳۸.
↑ مطالعات اجتماعی، کتاب درسی عمومی سال اول آموزش متوسطه، وزارت آموزش و پرورش-دفتر برنامه ریزی و تألیف کتب درسی، تهران، چاپ دوازدهم1389
برگرفته از «http://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%B4»
جایگاه ارزش ها در تئوری های مدیریت
فرهنگ عامل وحدت بخش ارزش های اجتماعی است كه به ارزشها نوعی یگانگی می بخشد.فرهنگ و ارزشها درمیان تعدادی از افراد جامعه، مشترك و ازنسلی به نسل دیگر منتقل می شود.فرهنگ سازمانی به عنوان یكی از مهمترین زیرسیستم های مدیریت، بارزترین جایی است كه ارزش ها در آن رشد می كند.
۱ - مرحوم دكتر كیا با ارائه مجموعه قضایایی، »تئوری مدیریت برمبنای اخلاق« را ارائه داده است.
۲ - مرحوم دكتر زندیه در مقاله ای تحت عنوان »فرضیه هایی در قلمرو مدیریت اسلامی« نكات قابل ملاحظه ای را مطرح ساخته است.
۳ - در ایـن مــورد بــه كتـاب »تصمیم گیری و خط مشی گذاری عمومی« نوشته دكتر سیدمهدی الوانی مراجعه شود.
منابع: ۱ - الوانی، سیدمهدی، مدیریت عمومی، تهران، نشرنی، ۱۳۷۹، چ چهاردهم.
۲ - استانلی، دیویس، مدیریت فرهنگ سازمانی، ترجمه ناصر میرسپاسی، تهران، نشر مروارید، ۱۳۷۳.
۳ - اپل بام، گالوی و استامف لوكالین، مدیریت استراتژیك، ترجمه عباس منوریان، تهران، مركز آموزش مدیریت دولتی، ۱۳۷۹.
۴ - بابایی،عبدالله، ارتباط ارزش های انسانی، تهران، انتشارات دستان، ۱۳۷۲.
۵ - باقریان، محمد، مفاهیم و چارچوب مدیریت راهبردی با نگرش های بومی، تهران، مركز آموزش مدیریت دولتی، ۱۳۷۹. ۶
- جانـاتـان، اچ، تـرنر، مفاهیم و كاربردهای جامعه شناسی، ترجمه محمد فولادی و محمدعزیز بختیاری، تهران، موسسه امام خمینی، ۱۳۷۸.
۷ - جفری، هریسون و كارول جان، مدیریت استراتژیك، ترجمه بهروز قاسمی، تهران، نشر آبتین، ۱۳۸۰.
۸ - دراكر، پیتر، چالش های مدیریت در سده ۲۱، ترجمه محمود طلوع، تهران، نشر رسا، ۱۳۷۹.
۹ - رابینز، استیفن پی، مبانی رفتار سازمانی، ترجمه علی پارسائیان و سیدمحمد اعرابی، تهران، پژوهشهای فرهنگی، ۱۳۷۳.
۱۰ - راگونات، مدیریت تطبیقی، ترجمه عباس منوریان، تهران، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، ۱۳۷۱.
۱۱ - كیا، منوچهر، تئوری های مدیریت و مدل های سازمان، تهران، مركز آموزش مدیریت دولتی، ۱۳۷۷.
۱۲ - گلوك، اف ویلیام جاچ، آزلارنس، سیاست بازرگانی و مدیریت استراتژیك ترجمه خلیل شورینی، تهران، یادواره كتاب، ۱۳۷۱.
۱۳ - سازگارا، پروین، نگاهی به جامعه شناسی با تاكید بر فرهنگ، تهران، نشر كویر، ۱۳۷۷.
۱۴ - سروش، عبدالكریم، مدارا و مدیریت، تهران، نشر صراط، ۱۳۷۶.
۱۵ - محسنی، منوچهر، جامعه شناسی عمومی، تهران، كتابخانه طهوری، ۱۳۷۴.
۱۶ - محمد افندی، حسن، نگرش توحیدی در مدیریت و امور عمومی، تهران، مركز آموزش مدیریت دولتی، ۱۳۷۶.
۱۷ - مصباح یزدی، محمدتقی، پیش نیازهای مدیریت اسلامی، تهران، موسسه امام خمینی، ۱۳۷۶.
۱۸ - زندیه، عبدالله، فرضیه هایی در مدیریت اسلامی، (مدیریت دولتی)، تهران، مركز آموزش مدیریت دولتی.
۱۹ - جمعی از نویسندگان، تبیین مفهوم مدیریت اسلامی، تهران، مركــز آمــوزش مــدیریـت دولتی۱۳۷۸
Welcome to the World Values Survey website. This is a place
The World Values Survey (WVS) network will carry out a new wave of surveys in 2010 - 2012. This will provide a 30-year time series for the analysis of social and political change.
The World Values Survey (WVS) network will carry out a new wave of surveys in 2010 - 2012. This will provide a 30-year time series for the analysis of social and political change. Building on the 1981 European Values Study (EVS), the EVS and WVS carried out a joint second wave in 1990; the WVS carried out a third wave in 1995; the EVS and WVS again did a joint survey in 1999-2001; and the WVS carried out its most recent wave of surveys in 2005-2007.
In March and April, 2009, a WVS working group will draft a core questionnaire and then circulate it to participants in the network for input. On the basis of the input received from partners around the world, the group's executive committee will meet in Stockholm in June 26-28, 2009 to agree on a draft questionnaire. This will then be circulated for a final round of input, and the core questionnaire will be adopted in September. Fieldwork will start in January, 2010 and will continue throughout 2012.
- WVS -
Thorleif Pettersson, member of the Executive Committee of the World Values Survey has passed away after a longer period of illness. He is missed by us all and his impact on the development of the World Values Survey Association can’t be overestimated.
Thorleif was Professor of Sociology of Religion at Uppsala University and devoted his working life to the study of human values and the role these values play in society. He was closely linked to both European and global research programs; the World Values Survey, The European Values Survey and the Uppsala University's "Impact" - programs – The Impact of Religion: Challenges for Society, Law and Democracy. The latter program is in the long term point of view aimed to no more and no less than, to help to create a better world. Thorleif has served in the Executive Committee of the World Values Survey for more than a decade and as such he played a central role in developing the global network of researcher and the association World Values Survey Association (WVSA).
Over the past 25-30 years, Thorleif gave his full attention to the study of value bases in both Europe and in the wider world. Above all, he has been concerned with the relationships between human values and the ongoing socio-cultural changes. What are the impacts on human orientation and the development of our societies, in regard of citizenship, democracy and human rights? His extensive contributions to the World Values Survey has been significant. He has been among the pioneering researchers helping to create the data series, that hundreds, if not thousands, social scientists around the world use on a daily basis. His role as social scientist has in this sense made him almost immortal. Articles and research reports inspired by his work are continuously presented and surely will be for a long time to come.
He was a highly valued friend, always joyful and god hearted. A person that made you happy every time you had the opportunity to meet him. His memory will live long through his many books and articles that gave and gives us constant inspiration for further comparative social science research with a global focus with the aim that, in Thorleifs’ spirit, contribute to tolerance, democracy, peace and understanding between different cultures, countries and people.
Ron Inglehart, USA
President of the World Values Survey Association
Bi Puranen, Sweden
Secretary General of the World Values Survey Association
Dan Brändström, Sweden
Former Director, Riksbankens Jubuileumsfond
In June 2009 colleagues and friends in the values reserach honoured Thorleif Pettersson with a festschrift, “Religion, democratic values and political conflict” (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Psychologia et Sociologia Religionum 23, uppsala 2009). This book is presented under the section "publications", sub section "books" at this website and can be downloaded for free.
Many friends have sent their condolences to the secretariat, below follows some of them:
I know exactly how we all feel because of our truly great loss. I have lost a great friend, a brother I can say. I really am at a loss for words to express my deep grief. We will all miss Thorleif greatly – his wisdom, his scholarship, his friendship and his sense of humour. Indeed, that sense of humour was intact when I last corresponded with him. May he rest in peace and bless you all.”
Rector of Bahcesehir University, Istanbul, Turkey
Member of the Executive Committe, WVSA
“It is with a deep sense of sorrow that I read the sad news. Thorleif was special to all of us both as a colleague and more importantly as a special human being. I know what it to lose someone close. I lost an only brother less than a month ago. My deepest sympathises to his family. We all pray for the departed soul and will always miss a special friends”
Principal Investigator WVSA , India
Political Science Faculty, Bangalore University, India
“Thorleif has left us. And still, he will remain with us as long as one of those who loved him remains. For 27 years, since some of us first met him, we have interacted at meetings, at workshops, at conferences, through e-mail, through the telephone…., to the point that in spite of distance we had a closer relationship than with friends or colleagues that live in the same town. Thorleif was a great scholar, a great friend, a great group member, and first of all, a man of peace. He always had a word for every body; he was the kind of person who always found a middle-of-the-road position to bring together the extremes, he was a natural bridge builder. We shall certainly miss him, but he will always be with us.”
Juan Diez Nicolas,
Executive Committee, WVSA
Principal Investigator WVSA, Spain
ASEP Madrid, Spain
“I had the privilege to know Thorleif for twelve years. The first time I met him was in Sanga Saby in 1998. Since then I grew constantly closer to him through the regular exchange in the context of the World Values Survey, which owes Thorleif so incredibly much.
Great praise has been given to Thorleif as a scientist. He was indeed a brilliant thinker who had so many creative and innovative ideas. He always found ways to shed new light on our data and was inspired by the most rigorous scientific standards.
Formidable as these qualities of Thorleif are, he left an even deeper mark on me as a person and human being. I will keep Thorleif in my memory as a real humanist and the finest character—he was a ‘beautiful mind.’ May he rest in peace.”
Executive Committee, Vice President, WVSA,
Principal Investigator, Germany
“Distance is a deceiving thing because those of us who saw Thorlief occasionally and learned to see in him a wonderful human being, might think he is still there only far away.
I remember him as a person who was genuinely in search of collective well being. He also played an important role in the development of the WVS as it is today.
For all those reasons and many more which I could write about I would propose we install a place for him in the project. It could be a papers series name for example. this would honour his memory."
Chair, Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC), WVSA,
Principal Investigator WVSA, Brazil
Latinobarómetro, Santiago, Chile
“This is sad news, indeed. Thorleif will continue to live in our hearts. He
will also be remembered for his contributions to a better understanding of
the role of values in human behavior. I am glad that he received his
Festschrift in time.We have lost a friend.”
Advisor, WVSA, Germany
Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, Germany
“He was a kind man. SWS (South Weather Station) will always recall how he took time to communicate with us and how he appreciated the WVS training that we provided Vietnam, even particularly citing the part he liked best - the circle of life exercise!”
Principal Investigator, The Philippines
Philippine Social Science Centre
“I am really sad to hear about Thorleif who is a great man and a dedicated person. We can not hear his joke in the WVS conference anymore. We have to put his name in our heart forever."
Nadra Muhamad Hosen
Principal Investigator, Indonesia
School of Social Sciences, Institute of Quranic Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia
“I feel deeply sorry for this loss. Thorleif always supported our work with enthusiam. He was always available when there was a conflict to solve or a problem to fix. Among all, I think he was a very good person and that is how I will remember him."
Jaime Diez Medrano
Director, JDSurvey and WVSA Data Archive, Madrid
“This is certainly very sad news even when we knew it was expected. I have also enjoyed Thorleiff friendship and the possibility of a closest exchange around our interest and commitment with religious issues and themes. It is a great loss.”
Treasurer, Executive Committee, WVSA
Principal Investigator WVSA, Peru
Departmento de Ciencias Sociales, Lima, Peru
“The news I just received about the loss of Thorleif were a shock to me. We lost a dear friend and researcher who left a valuable wealth of intellectual work and established values and mutual respect with others. May God bless him.”
Magued I. Osman, Ph.D.
Chairman, Information and Decision Support Center, The Egyptian Cabinet,
Principal Investigator, WVS Egypt
“We lost a very good friend and scientist and this fills my heart with great
sorrow. My deepest condolences to Thorleif’s dearest, he’ll be in our hearts."
Principal Investigator, WVSA Russia
“It is very sad news. We lost a friend and a great colleague."
Principal Investigator, WVSA Argentina
Scientific Advisory Board (SAC) of the WVSA
“Thorleif var i mange år den drivende kraften i det nordiske samarbeidet i WVS og EVS og han var en god venn og støtte for meg i mange sammenhenger."
Principal Investigator, WVSA, Norway
University of Trondheim, Norway
This map reflects the fact that a large number of basic values are closely correlated; they can be depicted in just two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation. ** Update ** Added supplementary data file.
Each country is positioned according to its people's values and not its geographical location. To a large extent the two coincide, but the map measures cultural proximity, not geographical proximity. Thus, Australia, Canada, the U.S. and Great Britain are cultural neighbors, reflecting their relatively similar values, despite their geographical dispersion.
Source: Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005: p. 64 based on the World Values Surveys, see www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
The World Values Surveys were designed to provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human concern, from religion to politics to economic and social life and two dimensions dominate the picture: (1) Traditional/ Secular-rational and (2) Survival/Self-expression values. These two dimensions explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance in a factor analysis of ten indicators-and each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important orientations.
The Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not. A wide range of other orientations are closely linked with this dimension. Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics.
The second major dimension of cross-cultural variation is linked with the transition from industrial society to post-industrial societies-which brings a polarization between Survival and Self-expression values. The unprecedented wealth that has accumulated in advanced societies during the past generation means that an increasing share of the population has grown up taking survival for granted. Thus, priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life. Inglehart and Baker (2000) find evidence that orientations have shifted from Traditional toward Secular-rational values, in almost all industrial societies. But modernization, is not linear-when a society has completed industrialization and starts becoming a knowledge society, it moves in a new direction, from Survival values toward increasing emphasis on Self-expression values.
A central component of this emerging dimension involves the polarization between Materialist and Postmaterialist values, reflecting a cultural shift that is emerging among generations who have grown up taking survival for granted. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life. These values also reflect mass polarization over tolerance of outgroups, including foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality. The shift from survival values to self-expression values also includes a shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child. And it goes with a rising sense of subjective well-being that is conducive to an atmosphere of tolerance, trust and political moderation. Finally, societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust.
This produces a culture of trust and tolerance, in which people place a relatively high value on individual freedom and self-expression, and have activist political orientations. These are precisely the attributes that the political culture literature defines as crucial to democracy.
** Update **
Brochure presenting the World Values Survey.
The World Values Survey (WVS) is a worldwide network of social scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life. The WVS in collaboration with EVS (European Values Study) carried out representative national surveys in 97 societies containing almost 90 percent of the world's population. These surveys show pervasive changes in what people want out of life and what they believe. In order to monitor these changes, the EVS/WVS has executed five waves of surveys, from 1981 to 2007.
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